Truth Conditions for Indicative Conditionals . Robert Stalnaker’s () account is of this type: consider a possible situation in which you touch. Yet if it is a valid inference, then the indicative conditional conclusion must be logically For a fuller discussion and defense of this concept, see Stalnaker. The problem is that if one accepts the validity of the intuitively reasonable direct argument from the material conditional to the ordinary indicative conditional.

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Indeed, it is not immediately clear what it would be to treat a conditional, construed according to Supp, as an assumption: Similarly for conditional promises: Take any argument formulated in this language. Eliza Block – – Mind Suppose you think line 1 is about times more likely than line 2. The valid ones are those which, in the special sense, preserve stalnwker or conditional probability.

We had an example above. It is invalid in Adams’s logic.

Indicative Conditionals

I think a sufficient condition for the truth of the conditional obtains. In particular, you don’t know whether A.

But we are now in a new context: His lesson was salutary and important. So treating the premises would be to require of a valid argument that it preserve certainty: Ernest Adams, has developed such a theory. Similarly, we conditionaks be certain, nearly certain, etc. He seems to advocate an error theory of conditionals: On development, it appears to be incompatible with construing conditionals as statements with truth conditions. On the contrary, I believe that if Conditionasl doesn’t win, Carter will win.


But the most fruitful development of the idea in my view takes seriously the last part of the above quote from Ramsey, and emphasises the fact that conditionals can be accepted with different degrees of closeness to certainty. I told you so. I think the consequent is true: However, we do not know which world is the actual world. For the purpose of doing mathematics, Frege’s judgement was probably correct. On a ‘strict conditional’ account, the following exchange should be in order: But we want more than synonyms.

Angelika Kratzer’s work on conditionals in linguistics has become influential. On this conception of validity, the premises are not treated as assumptions. Classical, Early, and Medieval Poetry and Poets: I believe so, but she might not.

That’s enough to know that if x is red, y is not red. See also Edgington and Jackson’s replypp. Despite intensive work of great ingenuity, this remains a highly controversial subject. Conditionlas have eliminated the possibility that both A and B are false.

Truth Conditions Revisited 4. To be sure that if ABwe need to be sure that whichever world w is a candidate for actuality, B is true at the nearest A -world to w. You can consistently be close to certain that the Republicans won’t win, while thinking it highly unlikely that if they win they will double income tax. We have a Stalnaker-like semantics.

Moritz Schulz – – Philosophical Studies 3: Consider a possible world in which A is true and otherwise differs minimally from the actual world.

Indicative Conditionals (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

But the latter, not the former, generalizes to conditionals. In that case, the facts determine the counterfacts.


Look at the possibilities for A and B on the left. The truth-functionalist call him Hook gets this right. Page references to And for argument involving only factual propositions, the converse is also true: This point is made in more detail by Edgingtonpp. They are based on a partial restoration of truth values, which has some merit. Widening our perspective to include these other conditionals tends to confirm Supp’s view.

Ways of handling compounds of conditionals have been proposed on the basis of these semantic values. At any stage in a conversation, many things are taken for granted by speaker and hearer, i.

Robert Stalnaker, Indicative conditionals – PhilPapers

The generally most fruitful, and time-honoured, approach to specifying the meaning of a complex sentence in terms of the meanings of its parts, is to specify the truth conditions of the complex sentence, in terms of the truth conditions of its parts. On the contrary, we would be intellectually disabled: As I think it is very likely to rain tomorrow, I think it’s very likely to be true that it will rain or snow tomorrow.

Any propositional attitude can be held categorically, or under a supposition.

Here are two sentence forms which are, intuitively, equivalent:. Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.